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NOTES
RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSY OVER
"TEACHING THE CONTROVERSY":
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEACHING
INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
David R. Bauer*
INTRODUCTION
A national debate is occurring once again over whether alternatives to
evolution should be taught in public schools. Even President George W.
Bush weighed in on the controversy when he commented that he believed
that both evolution and the theory of intelligent design-the theory that
humans are too complex to be the result of anything but an intelligent
designer- "should be taught in schools so people can understand what the
debate is about."' A recent study reported that the United States, when
compared with thirty-two European countries and Japan, has the second-
highest percentage of adults who think it is false to state, "Human beings, as
we know them, developed from earlier species of animals." 2 In a 2005
survey, sixty-four percent of U.S. respondents said they "were open to the
idea of teaching creationism in addition to evolution, while thirty-eight
percent favored replacing evolution with creationism." 3 In contrast, at least
eighty percent of adults in Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and France accept
the concept of evolution. 4
The debate has received so much attention that even the Vatican has
taken a position. The Vatican's chief astronomer, Rev. George Coyne, has
said "placing intelligent design theory alongside that of evolution in school
programs was 'wrong' and was akin to mixing apples with oranges." 5
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007. The author thanks Abner
Greene for his invaluable guidance and the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for
their very helpful editorial assistance.
1. Laurie Goodstein, Teaching of Creationism is Endorsed in New Survey, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 2005, at A9 (internal quotations omitted).
2. Jon D. Miller et al., Public Acceptance of Evolution, 313 Sci. 765, 765 (2006).
3. Goodstein, supra note 1.
4. Miller et al., supra note 2, at 765.
5. Nicole Winfield, Vatican Official Refutes Intelligent Design: Vatican's Chief
Astronomer Says Intelligent Design Doesn't Belong in Science Class, ABC News, Nov. 18,
2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory?id=1327926&page=l [hereinafter
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Coyne has further stated, "Intelligent design isn't science even though it
pretends to be." 6  At the time of this writing, Pope Benedict XVI, in
recognition of the rising contentiousness of the debate between science and
belief, is meeting with his former doctoral students to discuss the topic of
evolution.7
In addition, since 2001, the state legislatures or boards of education in
approximately twenty-five states have considered proposals that would
change the way evolution is taught, some of which seek to include
discussion of intelligent design and creationism. 8 In 2005, approximately
forty-seven local school boards considered similar proposals.9 Of these
proposals, the Kansas Board of Education's modification of its state science
curriculum standards in 2005 has received the most attention. 10  On
Election Day 2005, the Kansas State Board of Education adopted new
standards, by a 6 to 4 vote, that would in essence allow for the affirmative
teaching of intelligent design in public schools."I However, on August 2,
2006, the board members who voted in favor of the revisions were voted
out of office, and the new board members promised to restore the standards
so that the standards would not permit attacks on evolution.12
The debate over teaching intelligent design has also entered the courts. A
variety of pending lawsuits allege that decisions to incorporate alternative
origins theories or critiques of evolution into public school curricula violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.' 3 To date, only the case
of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District has reached a conclusion. 14 In
Dover, the court sided with parents who challenged a school board's
decision to include information about intelligent design during the teaching
Vatican Official]. The Vatican clarified an earlier statement by Pope Benedict XVI, who
declared the universe an "intelligent project." Pope Cites World's 'Intelligent Project,'
Foxnews.com, Nov. 13, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,175362,00.html.
6. Vatican Official, supra note 5.
7. Ian Fisher, Professor-Turned-Pope Leads a Seminar on Evolution, N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 2006, at A3.
8. Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars: Coast-to-Coast Challenges, Time, Aug. 15,
2005, at 27, 28-29; see also Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the
Objective Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 417, 421 (2006).
9. See Bowman, supra note 8; Wallis, supra note 8.
10. Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Board Approves Challenges to Evolution: New Standards
also Redefine Science, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2005, at A14.
11. Id. The debate over how evolution should be taught in Kansas has existed since at
least 1999. Id. For a review of how the standards were revised and why the revisions would
permit the teaching of intelligent design in Kansas schools, see Anthony Kirwin, Toto, I've A
Feeling We're... Still in Kansas? The Constitutionality of Intelligent Design and the 2005
Kansas Science Education Standards, 7 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 657, 689-98 (2006).
12. Monica Davey & Ralph Blumenthal, Fight over Evolution Shifts in Kansas School
Board Vote, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2006, at A15.
13. U.S. Const. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion .. "). For a summary of the lawsuits recently filed, see Tresa Baldas, 'Big Bang' of
Suits Focus on Evolution: New Fronts Open in Old, Familiar Fight, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 12,
2005, at 1.
14. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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of evolution in a biology class. 15 The trial generated so much publicity that
on Election Day 2005, which was a little over a month before the decision
was issued, the entire school board was voted out. 16
Although the events in Dover and Kansas might represent potential
setbacks for proponents of teaching alternative origins theories in public
school science classes, efforts to alter evolution curricula are still underway
in other states. 17 While the strategy to introduce intelligent design in Dover
was found unconstitutional, variations of such proposals will continue to be
explored and challenged.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze whether substantively teaching
intelligent design in public schools violates the Establishment Clause. Part
I of this Note introduces the theory of intelligent design, as well as the
various legal principles and jurisprudence relevant to analyzing whether
teaching intelligent design in public schools would violate the
Establishment Clause. Part II reviews the debate among legal
commentators over these issues and discusses the Dover decision in detail.
Part III attempts to resolve this debate by arguing that teaching intelligent
design in public schools as a valid scientific theory of origins would violate
the Establishment Clause because the theory of intelligent design is an
inherently religious doctrine and is not science. Part III argues that it may
be constitutional to describe intelligent design as a religious doctrine in
public schools so long as intelligent design is not endorsed as a valid
scientific theory and views on its merits are not discussed. However Part
III concludes that it would be difficult for teachers to describe intelligent
design without provoking a fact-intensive constitutional inquiry. Therefore,
this Note recommends that if public school teachers are asked about
intelligent design, they should inform students that some people believe in
religious understandings of human origins, and students should turn to their
families or places of worship to learn about those understandings.
I. THE THEORY OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND RELEVANT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Theory of Intelligent Design
The theory of intelligent design states that life is too complex to have
evolved by way of natural selection and that therefore is the result of
intelligent causation. The theory is comprised of three tenets:
1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable.
15. Id. at 766. For a complete discussion of Dover, see infra Part II.B. 1.
16. Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Slate Outpolls Rivals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2005, at
A24.
17. Laurie Goodstein, Schools Nationwide Study Impact of Evolution Ruling, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 2005, at A20.
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2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified
complexity.
3. Intelligent causation best explains specified complexity. 18
In addition, "[d]esign. theorists hold these.. tenets not as religious
presuppositions but as conclusions of sound scientific arguments."' 19 The
following discussion briefly provides an overview of the three tenets of
intelligent design and the argument by design theorists as to why these
tenets are not held as "religious presuppositions." 20
1. Design Is Defined and Empirically Detectable
Michael Behe, one of intelligent design's foremost proponents, defines
the term "design" and explains the ability to empirically detect evidence of
design as follows:
What is "design?" Design is simply the purposeful arrangement of
parts .... The upshot of this conclusion-that anything could have been
purposely arranged-is that we cannot know that something has not been
designed. The scientific problem then becomes, how do we confidently
detect design? When is it reasonable to conclude, in the absence of
firsthand knowledge or eyewitness accounts, that something has been
designed? For discrete physical systems-if there is not a gradual route
to their production-design is evident when a number of separate,
interacting components are ordered in such a way as to accomplish a
function beyond the individual components. The greater the specificity of
the interacting components required to produce the function, the greater is
our confidence in the conclusion of design. 2 1
This is Behe's concept of "irreducible complexity," and it provides the
framework for detecting design. 22 Design theorists purport to be able to
empirically detect evidence of design by identifying the function of a
biological structure, examining the relationship between the function of the
structure's parts and the structure's overall function, and determining
whether the structure is organized in such a way to demonstrate a sufficient
amount of "specified complexity." 23  A structure demonstrates such
complexity if it can be demonstrated that, when one part of the structure is
removed, the structure ceases functioning. 24  If a biological structure
requires all of its parts to function, it cannot have evolved from some prior
version that was lacking one of its parts because, according to design
theorists, "[n]atural selection can only act on systems that perform functions
18. William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology
247 (1999).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Michael J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box 193-94 (1998).
22. Id. at 203.
23. Id. at 193-94.
24. Id.
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that help organisms survive." 25 Accordingly, the structure is more likely to
have been intelligently designed. Formulated this way, design theorists
distinguish themselves from so-called "theistic evolutionists who think
design can only be seen through 'the eyes of faith', [because] design
theorists believe that scientific evidence actually points to intelligent
design-that intelligent design is . . . 'empirically detectable.' ' 26
intelligent design proponents discuss various biological structures and
systems as examples of what they claim offer scientific evidence of
intelligent design. Some of the most frequently discussed examples include
the organization of DNA, the human eye, blood clotting mechanisms, and
the motor function of a bacterial flagellum.27 In short, according to design
theorists, given the complexity of these examples, none could have evolved
by way of natural selection because any prior version of them would have
no biological function.28 Unfortunately for design theorists, the scientific
establishment has fiercely contested the scientific validity of the design
theory generally and its application to these and other examples. 29
2. Intelligent Design Rejects Methodological Naturalism
One of the reasons intelligent design proponents claim their theory is
rejected by the scientific establishment is that intelligent design cannot be
supported by "methodological naturalism. ' 30 Methodological naturalism is
the "view that science must be restricted solely to undirected natural
processes. '31  William Dembski has outlined why this viewpoint is
problematic for intelligent design. He argues that "[s]o long as
methodological naturalism sets the ground rules for how the game of
science is to be played, intelligent design has no chance of success....
Logically the only alternative [to naturalistic evolution] is intelligent
design," and since many do not consider intelligent design to constitute a
form of science, the "simple way out of this impasse [is to] dump
methodological naturalism."32 Dembski further argues that
[n]aturalism is the disease. Intelligent design is the cure. Intelligent
design is a two-pronged approach for eradicating naturalism. On the one
hand, intelligent design presents a scientific and philosophical critique of
naturalism.... The other prong of intelligent design is a positive
25. Michael J. Behe et al., Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe 13 (1999).
26. Id. at 12.
27. See, e.g., Behe, supra note 21, at 74-97; Behe, supra note 25, at 13; Dembski, supra
note 18, at 148, 177-78.
28. See, e.g., Behe, supra note 21, at 74-97; Behe, supra note 25, at 13; Dembski, supra
note 18, at 148, 177-78.
29. See, e.g., Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological,
and Scientific Perspectives (Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001); Niall Shanks, God, the Devil and
Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (2004); Why Intelligent Design Fails: A
Scientific Critique of the New Creationism (Matt Young & Taner Edis eds., 2005).
30. Dembski, supra note 18, at 119.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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scientific research program. As a positive research program, intelligent
design is a scientific discipline that systematically investigates the effects
of intelligent causes. 33
Therefore, according to design proponents, because intelligent design, by
definition, cannot be explained by undirected or natural causes, and because
such causal mechanisms are required by the scientific establishment,
intelligent design cannot be deemed to constitute a form of science by the
establishment unless science allows for explanation by intelligent and
unnatural causes.
3. Intelligent Design Infers the Existence of, but Does Not Identify, an
Intelligent Designer
intelligent design requires the existence of an intelligent designer for the
theory to hold together. To illustrate this point, Michael Behe has described
intelligent design as
an elephant in the roomful of scientists who are trying to explain the
development of life. The elephant is labeled "intelligent design." To a
person who does not feel obligated to restrict his search to unintelligent
causes, the straightforward conclusion is that many biochemical systems
were designed. They were designed not by the laws of nature, not by
chance and necessity; rather they were planned. The designer knew what
the systems would look like when they were completed, then took steps to
bring the systems about. Life on earth at its most fundamental level, in its
most critical components, is the product of intelligent activity. 34
Notwithstanding the requirement of an unnatural and intelligent cause for
the existence and development of life, "[i]ntelligent design is modest in
what it attributes to the designing intelligence responsible for the specified
complexity in nature. 35 To explain why the designer is not identified,
Dembski quotes from the intelligent design textbook Of Pandas and
People: "'Science cannot answer this question; it must leave it to religion
and philosophy.' 36 To elaborate upon this statement, Dembski offers that
[i]ntelligent design as a scientific theory is distinct from a theological
doctrine of creation. Creation presupposes a Creator who originates the
world and all its materials. Intelligent design attempts only to explain the
arrangement of materials within an already given world. Design theorists
argue that certain arrangements of matter, especially in biological
systems, clearly signal a designing intelligence.37
In other words, design theorists explicitly claim that accepting intelligent
design as true does not require religious faith. On the other hand, some
33. Id. at 120.
34. Behe, supra note 21, at 193.
35. Dembski, supra note 18, at 247.
36. Id. at 248 (quoting Percival Davis & Dean Kenyon, Of Pandas and People: The
Central Question of Biological Origins 7 (2d ed. 1993)).
37. Id.
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scientists and legal commentators have argued that intelligent design is a
religious doctrine because it is a sham for teaching creationism. 38 Other
commentators reject this argument.39 Therefore, the threshold question that
must be addressed in determining whether teaching intelligent design in
public schools violates the Establishment Clause is whether intelligent
design constitutes a religion for constitutional purposes. However, this
question is somewhat complicated by the fact that courts have not adopted a
universal definition of the term "religion" as it appears in the First
Amendment. Therefore, determining whether intelligent design constitutes
a religion for constitutional purposes first requires understanding how
courts have historically defined the term "religion" as it appears in the First
Amendment. Part I.B of this Note reviews that jurisprudence.
B. Definitions of "Religion " as It Appears in the First Amendment
In Establishment Clause cases, if it is contested that a particular doctrine
or belief is religious, it becomes particularly important to define religion. 40
However, the problem in considering whether intelligent design can be
construed as a religious doctrine is that, historically, courts have been
reluctant to adopt a universal definition of religion to avoid the obvious
danger that an arbitrary demarcation as to what constitutes religion could
lead to unfair decisions and judicial bias.41 The following discussion
reviews U.S. Supreme Court and federal court decisions that define
religion. In Part II, this Note will address the debate over whether
intelligent design constitutes a religion for constitutional purposes given
this jurisprudence. In Part III, this Note will argue that, because intelligent
design posits the existence of a supernatural creator of man, the theory
satisfies any of these definitions and therefore is an inherently religious
doctrine.
1. Supreme Court Decisions Defining Religion
Over time, the Supreme Court has fluctuated between relatively narrow
definitions of religion that conform to the Christian belief in God and
relatively broad definitions such as the so-called "parallel position" test.42
In the Court's earliest decision that defined religion, Davis v. Beason, the
Court upheld an Idaho law that required electors to swear that, among other
things, they were not bigamists or polygamists.43 The defendant in the
38. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
40. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L. Rev.
753, 756 (1984).
41. See Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 Yale L.J. 791, 793-94
(1997).
42. For a more complete discussion of these trends, see id.; Note, Towards a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978) [hereinafter Harvard
Note].
43. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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case, Samuel Davis, was a Mormon who was convicted of falsely swearing
to the oath.44 Davis appealed his conviction partly on the basis that the law
prevented Mormons from acting as electors and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause. 45 The Court rejected Davis's argument because
bigamy and polygamy were considered crimes "by the laws of all civilized
and Christian countries," 46 and therefore "[t]o call their advocacy a tenet of
religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. ' 47 For the Court,
[t]he term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with the
cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from
the latter.
4 8
Forty-one years later, the Court continued to conceive of religion in a
similarly theistic way. In United States v. Macintosh, the Court examined a
naturalization applicant's refusal to join the military on the basis of his
religious beliefs and explained that "[w]e are a Christian people, according
to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with
reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God," but that "unqualified
allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the
land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not
inconsistent with the will of God." 49
The Court expanded its concept of religion during the course of the
twentieth century, perhaps because there was a large influx of immigrants
that resulted not only in an increased number of non-Christians, but also an
increased number of religious sects in the United States.50 In some
respects, the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Watkins51 presented the perfect
vehicle for the Court to confront the issue of whether religion requires a
theistic definition. In Torcaso, at issue was a provision of the Maryland
constitution that stated, "[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
44. Id. at 334-35.
45. Id. at 336-37.
46. Id. at 341.
47. Id. at 341-42.
48. Id. at 342. This conception essentially follows what James Madison termed "'the
duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging it."' Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (quoting James Madison, A Memorial
and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man, in Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in
America 84 (J. Bleu ed., 1964)). The Court followed this approach because, as Professor
Eduardo Pefialver notes, although many diverse sects existed in the United States in the early
19th century, "almost all religious people were Christians and therefore unlikely to object to
a definition of religion that excluded nontheistic religions." Pefialver, supra note 41, at 796
n.30 (citing J. Gordon Melton, The Development of American Religion: An Interpretive
View, in Encyclopedia of American Religions 1, 14-15 (5th ed. 1996)).
49. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (citing Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1892)).
50. Pefialver, supra note 41, at 796; see also Harvard Note, supra note 42, at 1069.
51. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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declaration of belief in the existence of God . ,,52 Since Torcaso was
denied a commission of notary public because he refused to swear his belief
in God, he challenged the constitutionality of the provision.53 The Court
sided with Torcaso and struck down the Maryland provision. In doing so,
the Court held,
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.54
The Court also noted that included "[a]mong religions in this country which
do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others."55
Shortly after Torcaso, the Court in United States v. Seeger56 considered
the concept of religion in a way that "embrace[d] the ever-broadening
understanding of the modem religious community. '57 Daniel Seeger had
been convicted for refusing induction into the United States armed forces. 58
He challenged the conviction by arguing that he qualified for an exemption
under section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
which exempts from training and service persons who are opposed to
participating in war because of their religious training or beliefs. 59 The Act
defined "religious training and belief' as "an individual's belief in relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation," not including "essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 60 Seeger refused to
answer whether or not he believed in a Supreme Being, arguing "that his
'skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God' did 'not necessarily mean
lack of faith in anything whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion
to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely
ethical creed.' ' 61 However, Seeger's claim for exemption was initially
rejected "solely because it was not based upon a 'belief in a relation to a
52. Id. at 489 (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 495 n.11.
56. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
57. Id. at 180.
58. Id. at 164-65.
59. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456() (2000).
60. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604, 612 (1948) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000)). The name of the Selective Service Act of 1948
was changed to the "Universal Military Training and Service Act" in 1951. See Universal
Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, sec. 1, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75 (1951)
61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (quoting from the record).
2006] 1027
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Supreme Being' as required by § 6(j) of the Act."'62 As a result, the Court
was forced to interpret whether Seeger's beliefs could be considered
religious within the meaning of the statute. The Court concluded that
Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather than the
designation 'God,' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious
training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this
construction, the test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have
parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say
that one is 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and the other is not.63
This test became known as the "parallel position test."'64
Finally, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court defined creation science as a
"religious viewpoint" in which "a supernatural being created humankind. '65
The Court cited statements from the legislative history of the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in Public
School Instruction Act66 to conclude that "the term 'creation science,' as
contemplated by the legislature that adopted th[e] Act, embodies the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation
of humankind. '67 Among the statements that appeared in the legislative
history were those by Edward Boudreaux, a leading expert on creation
science who noted that "creation scientists point to high probability that life
was created by an intelligent mind."'68 Boudreaux also equated "creation
science with a theory pointing to conditions of a creator ' 69 and stated that
"[c]reation . . . requires the direct involvement of a supernatural
intelligence. ' 70 In addition, another leading expert, Luther Sunderland,
"described creation science as postulating that everything was created by
some intelligence or power external to the universe. '71 On the basis of
these and other statements, the Court reasoned that creation science
constituted a religious doctrine.72
62. Id. at 167.
63. Id. at 165-66.
64. Although the U.S. Supreme Court's Seeger decision is one of statutory
interpretation, courts and commentators have endorsed its constitutional reading. See, e.g.,
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring); Greenawalt,
supra note 40, at 759-60; Harvard Note, supra note 42, at 1064; Pefialver, supra note 41, at
797-98, 798 n.48.
65. Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987).
66. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (1982), invalidated by Edwards, 482 U.S.
at 593.
67. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592 (1987).
68. Id. at 591 (internal quotations omitted).
69. Id. at 591 n.12 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 592.
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2. Federal Courts of Appeals Decisions Defining Religion
Various federal courts have set forth their own definitions of religion. Of
these formulations, the definition articulated by Judge Arlin Adams of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Malnak v. Yogi 73 has been
argued to be the most influential. 74 The court in Malnak held that the
teaching of a course called "Science of Creative Intelligence Transcendental
Meditation" ("SCI/TM") was religious and that teaching the course in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause. 75 The textbook used in
the course taught "that 'pure creative intelligence' is the basis of life, and
that through the process of Transcendental Meditation students can perceive
the full potential of their lives."76 To practice SCI/TM, it was necessary for
students to acquire a mantra by attending a "puja," which involved, among
other things, making offerings to the "Guru Dev. ' 77  The puja was
conducted outside of school on a Sunday. 78
The Third Circuit relied upon the district court's analysis, which was
grounded in prior Supreme Court determinations of what constituted
religion.79 Interestingly, the court rejected the defendants' contention that
the cases cited by the district court 80 were inapposite because "each of the
prior cases was represented or conceded to be religious in nature whereas
defendants in the instant action assert that the activities are not religious in
nature." 81  The court responded to the defendants' argument by saying
"'[t]he cases, at the very least, reveal the types of activity and belief that
have been considered religious under the first amendment.' 82
Judge Adams, however, while concurring with the court's holding,
disagreed that the result could be supported by relying on past precedent.
He instead proposed that the result should be "largely based upon a newer,
more expansive reading of 'religion' that has been developed in the last two
decades in the context of free exercise and selective service cases." 83
Adams argued that these cases supported defining religion "by analogy." 84
In other words, the approach to determining whether a particular set of
73. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
74. Pefialver, supra note 41, at 799.
75. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (per curiam).
76. Id. at 198.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 199 (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
80. See supra note 79.
81. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Arlin Adams also recognized that "this is the first
appellate court decision ... that has concluded that a set of ideas constitutes a religion over
the objection and protestations of secularity by those espousing those ideas." Id.
84. Id. at 207.
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ideas constitutes religion "looks to the familiar religions as models in order
to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is
confronting the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as
unquestioned and accepted 'religions.' 85
To accomplish this task, Adams defined "three useful indicia that are
basic to our traditional religions and that are themselves related to the
values that undergird the first amendment. ' 86 First and most important for
Adams is the
nature of the ideas in question [which] means that a court must, at least to
a degree, examine the content of the supposed religion, not to determine
its truth or falsity, or whether it is schismatic or orthodox, but to
determine whether the subject matter it comprehends is consistent with
the assertion that it is, or is not, a religion.87
Adams elaborated that under this conception, religion should be expected to
address "fundamental" or "ultimate" concerns. 88
Adams's second indicia holds that a set of religious ideas are
comprehensive, and therefore, "[c]ertain isolated answers to 'ultimate'
questions" are not religious. 89 According to Adams, it is under this element
that evolution does not constitute religion while theology does. 90 A
scientific theory such as evolution may "touch on many ultimate concerns,
but it is unlikely to proffer a systematic series of answers to them that might
begin to resemble a religion .... [Evolution is] offensive to some religious
groups, but it is not in itself religious." 91 Adams argued that in contrast,
theology and its conception as a type of "ruling science" constitute an
example of a religious idea. 92 Ultimately, Adams concluded that
[t]he teaching of isolated theories that might be thought to address
"ultimate" questions is not the teaching of such a "ruling science." When
these theories are combined into a comprehensive belief system, however,
the result may well become such a "ruling science" that overflows into
other academic disciplines as the guiding idea of the student's pursuits. It
is just such a "ruling science" that the establishment clause guards
against. 93
Finally, the third element in determining whether a set of ideas is religious
is whether "any formal, external, or surface signs... may be analogized to
85. Id.
86. Id. at 207-08.
87. Id. at 208.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 208-09.
90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 209 & n.41.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id.
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accepted religions." 94 However, Adams acknowledged that a religion may
exist without such signs.95
Ultimately, Adams concluded that SCI/TM constituted a religion because
it answered ultimate truths including "the nature of both world and man, the
underlying sustaining force of the universe, and the way to unlimited
happiness. '96 SCI/TM represented a "basis of everything," and meditation
is "presented as a means for contacting this 'impelling life force."' 97
Finally, SCI/TM is "sufficiently comprehensive to avoid the suggestion of
an isolated theory unconnected with any particular world view or basic
belief system" and included formalities such as the puja ceremony. 98
While Adams's test may have proved highly influential, it should be
noted that Judge Richard Cardamone of the Second Circuit has quoted from
William James in proposing a different test for religion: "'the feelings,
acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider
the divine."' 99 According to Cardamone, "James used the word 'divine' in
its broadest sense as denoting any object that is godlike, whether it is or is
not a specific deity."'100
The foregoing review demonstrates that defining religion for
constitutional purposes has been a difficult undertaking for courts. Indeed,
as will be discussed in Part II, given this difficulty, some commentators
have argued that intelligent design does not constitute a religion for
constitutional purposes. On the other hand, other commentators have
argued that intelligent design is a religion because it professes a belief in a
theistic creator. The only court decision on the matter thus far, Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District, sided with the latter set of commentators,
finding that the "religious nature of [intelligent design] would be readily
apparent to an objective observer."' 1 1 This Note will attempt to resolve this
debate in Part III.
94. Id. ("Such signs might include formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence
of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and
other similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions.").
95. Id.
96. Id. at 213.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 213-14. Adams ultimately applied his test in writing the majority opinion in
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), finding that the organization MOVE
was not a religion but rather a type of "philosophical naturalism." Malnak, 592 F.2d at 1035
(Adams, J., concurring). Among other factors that distinguished MOVE from a religion was
that MOVE does not mention or place emphasis upon "what might be classified as a
fundamental concern. MOVE does not claim to be theistic: indeed it recognizes no
Supreme Being and refers to no transcendental or all-controlling force." Id. at 1033. The
Tenth Circuit has also applied Adams's test in United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th
Cir. 1996).
99. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting William James,
The Varieties of Religious Experience 31 (1910)).
100. Id.
101. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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Assuming for the moment that intelligent design constitutes a religion,
the question arises as to whether mandating its substantive teaching in
public schools violates the Establishment Clause. Of course, intelligent
design is not the first theory proposed as an alternative to evolution, and
therefore it is instructive to examine how the Supreme Court has analyzed
past attempts to teach alternative origins theories in public schools. As the
following discussion will demonstrate, the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause is not without its own controversy, which further adds
to the complexity of the debate surrounding the teaching of intelligent
design in public schools.
C. Jurisprudence Regarding the Teaching of Origins Theories to Public
School Students
The 1925 trial of Scopes v. State may have been the first and most
famous litigation into the constitutionality of teaching origins theories in
public schools. 102 However, the starting point for the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the topic is Epperson v. Arkansas.10 3 In Epperson, the
Court struck down an Arkansas statute which, adapted from the Tennessee
law at issue in the Scopes case, banned the teaching of evolution in any
state-supported school or university. 10 4 Just over twenty years later, the
Supreme Court held that the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution Science in Public School Instruction Act
("Creationism Act" or "Act") 10 5 violated the Establishment Clause because
the Act's primary purpose was to "advance a particular religious belief."'10 6
The following section reviews each of these opinions and pays particular
attention to the reasoning underlying the Court's conclusions that the
legislation in both these cases violated the Establishment Clause because
the legislation was enacted for impermissible purposes.
1. Epperson v. Arkansas
In Epperson, the Court struck down a ban on the teaching of evolution in
public schools and universities on the ground that the ban was enacted with
a religious purpose and therefore it violated the Establishment Clause. 10 7
102. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). At the trial court level, Scopes was
convicted and fined one hundred dollars for violating the Tennessee "monkey law" of 1925,
because he taught evolution to his public school students. Id. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee upheld the constitutionality of the statute but reversed Scopes's conviction
because the jury, not the judge, should have assessed Scopes's fine and ordered that a nolle
prosequi be entered. Id. at 367.
103. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
104. Id.
105. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (1982), invalidated by Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987).
106. Edwards, 482 U.S at 593.
107. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-09.
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Specifically, the Court found that the Arkansas legislature enacted the ban
to
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is
contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the
exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion has
been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state
policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. It is clear
that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. 0 8
To reach this conclusion, the Court followed the test articulated in Abington
School District: "'[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. '109 In articulating this test, the Court acknowledged that the
study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and historic viewpoint,
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, need not
collide with the First Amendment's prohibition[; however] the State may
not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which
"aid or oppose" any religion." 10
Moreover, "[t]his prohibition is absolute. It forbids alike the preference of a
religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic
to a particular dogma."''I I
After articulating this test, the Court also made clear that a statute can run
afoul of the First Amendment not only if the statute expressly sets forth a
religious purpose for its enactment, but even if the statute's stated purpose
is a pretext for one that is religious. 1 2 In so doing, the Court compared the
text of the Arkansas statute with its antecedent-the Tennessee law at issue
in the Scopes trial.' 13 The Arkansas law that the Court struck down in
Epperson "ma[de] it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or
university to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals, or to adopt or use in any such
institution a textbook that teaches this theory." 114 In contrast, the Court
noted that the Tennessee law "candidly stated its purpose: to make it
unlawful to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of
man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended
from a lower order of animals."' 1 5 The Court went on to suggest that
[p]erhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced
Arkansas to adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
108. Id. at 107-08.
109. Id. at 107 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
110. Id. at 106 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 225).
111. Id. at 106-07.
112. Id. at 108-09.
113. Id. at 109.
114. Id. at 98-99.
115. Id. at 108-09 (internal quotations omitted).
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reference to "the story of the Divine Creation of man" as taught in the
Bible, but there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same:
to suppress the teaching of the theory which, it was thought, "denied" the
divine creation of man.1 16
Thus finding the legislation was indeed a pretext for advancing a religious
purpose, the Court held that the legislation violated the Establishment
Clause. 117
2. Edwards v. Aguillard
The next and last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of teaching
alternatives to evolution in public schools was in its Edwards v. Aguillard
decision in 1987.118 In Edwards, the Court held that Louisiana's
Creationism Act,1 19 which required that the "scientific evidences of both
creation and evolution be taught whenever either [was] taught,"'120 violated
the Establishment Clause because the Act's primary purpose,
notwithstanding the Louisiana legislature's stated secular purpose of
protecting academic freedom, was to "advance a particular religious
belief."121
Before reaching its core analysis of whether the Creationism Act violated
the Establishment Clause, the Edwards Court devoted a section of its
opinion to explaining that the public elementary and secondary school
system presents a "special context" for analyzing Establishment Clause
issues. 122 More specifically, the Court stated that it has been
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment
Clause in elementary and secondary schools [because] [f]amilies entrust
public schools with the education of their children, but condition their
trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the
student and his or her family [and] [s]tudents in such institutions are
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.' 23
Consequently, the Court reasoned, its Establishment Clause analysis would
proceed "mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the context of
public elementary and secondary schools."' 124
The Court then applied the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,125
which, since its adoption in 1971, had at the time been applied in all
116. Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
117. Id.
118. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
119. See supra note 105.
120. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 598.
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id. at 583.
123. Id. at 583-84 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 585.
125. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Establishment Clause cases except one. 126 The Lemon test provides a three-
pronged approach to determining whether legislation is valid under the
Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."'12 7 Legislation violates
the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.
In Edwards, the Creationism Act failed under the purpose prong of the
Lemon test. The Court found that regardless of the purpose stated by the
Louisiana legislature, "the purpose of the Creationism Act was to
restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious
viewpoint. 1 2 8 Therefore, the Edwards court applied the same reasoning as
that of the Epperson court by finding that the Louisiana legislature's stated
secular purpose of protecting academic freedom was a pretext for the
"preeminently" religious purpose of "advanc[ing] a religious doctrine by
requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public
school classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects
evolution in its entirety."'1 29
The Court began its analysis by examining the relationship of the
Creationism Act's stated purpose to its actual purpose. 130 The Court had
trouble interpreting the meaning of the Act's stated purpose of protecting
"academic freedom" but concluded that even if it were read to mean
"'teaching all of the evidence' with respect to the origin of human beings,"
the Court did not see how "outlawing the teaching of evolution or...
requiring the teaching of creation science" furthered this purpose. 13 1
Underlying the Court's conclusion were three fundamental problems with
Louisiana's position: (1) Teachers already enjoyed academic freedom in
the classroom, subject to curriculum and legal proscriptions, and therefore
legislation was not necessary to grant or enhance this freedom; (2) although
the Act's goal was to present two theories in a balanced and fair way, the
Court found that the Act preferred the teaching of creation science over the
teaching of evolution; and (3) both the timing and frequency of teaching the
two theories were perfectly correlated. 132
126. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(holding that opening a session of the Nebraska legislature with prayer led by a state-paid
chaplain did not violate the Establishment Clause)). As the Edwards Court noted, the Court
in Marsh justified its decision based on the historical acceptance of the practice. Id.
According to the Court in Edwards, this "approach is not useful in determining the proper
roles of church and state in public schools, since free public education was virtually
nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted." Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
127. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
128. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593.
129. Id. at 596.
130. Id. at 586.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 587-94.
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In regard to the first problem, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit,
which had already found that "no law prohibited Louisiana public school
teachers from teaching any scientific theory"'133 and that therefore, because
the Creationism Act provided teachers with no authority they did not
already have, the Act's "stated purpose is not furthered by it."'1 34
With respect to the second problem, the Court found that a number of
provisions of the Act not only provided teachers with resources and support
for teaching creation science, but also protected them from discrimination
by school boards if they chose to become creation scientists or teach
creationism. 135 In contrast, the Act had no comparable provisions regarding
the teaching of evolution. 136
Finally, the Court found that the Act dictated that creationism only would
be taught when evolution was taught, and therefore the Act was not
designed to protect academic freedom but, in effect, was designed to restrict
it by "discrediting 'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn
with the teaching of creationism."' 137
After rejecting the stated secular purpose of the Creationism Act, the
Court proceeded to determine that the Act indeed had a "preeminent
religious purpose."' 138 Relying on the "historic and contemporaneous link
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching
of evolution," which was reviewed in McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education, and its holding in Epperson, the Court concluded the same
"historic and contemporaneous antagonisms" between teaching evolution
and certain religious doctrine were present and therefore the "preeminent
purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind."' 139 The Court
supported this conclusion by quoting from various statements in the Act's
legislative history that distinguished creation science from a scientific
discipline and demonstrated that creation science constitutes a religious
doctrine. 140
The Court did not challenge the claims that creation science was
supported by scientific evidence, and, notwithstanding those claims, ruled
that the Creationism Act failed because it "embodie[d] a particular religious
tenet" and "further[ed] religion in violation of the Establishment Clause." 141
133. Id. at 587 (citing Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985)).
134. Id. The Court found this situation was analogous to that in Wallace v. Jaffree, where
the Court rejected the stated secular purpose of providing a one-minute period of silence for
meditation in part because this purpose was already served by an existing state law. Id. at
587-88 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985)).
135. Id. at 588.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 589 (quoting Edwards, 765 F.2d at 1257).
138. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 590.
139. Id. at 590-91 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968); McLean v. Ark.
Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-64 (E.D. Ark. 1982)).
140. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text..
141. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593, 594,
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Nevertheless, the Court felt obligated to put a disclaimer on its opinion in
stating that it did not hold
simply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of
prevailing scientific theories be taught[;] . .. [rather,] teaching a variety of
scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might
be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the
effectiveness of science instruction. 142
In fact, Justice Powell's concurring opinion faced the issue more directly:
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory
does not render its purpose secular. In reaching its conclusion that the
Act is unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the
underpinnings of creationism may be supported by scientific evidence."
And there is no need to do so. Whatever the academic merit of particular
subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of promoting a
particular religious belief. 143
Putting these conclusions together, Edwards suggests that it may be
constitutional to teach competing scientific theories of origins with an
actual secular intent to foster scientific debate, but calling a theory scientific
or citing scientific evidence in support of a theory may not be enough to
demonstrate an actual secular purpose. The theory can purport to be
scientific, but its mandated teaching in public schools can nonetheless
violate the Establishment Clause if the actual purpose of teaching the theory
is to advance a religious viewpoint or religion generally.]44
3. Disagreement over Edwards and the Meaning of Lemon's Purpose Prong
The application of Lemon's purpose prong in Edwards is not without
criticism. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia issued a rather scathing
dissent that argued the Court owed the legislature more deference in
142. Id. at 593-94.
143. Id. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
144. Between the Edwards decision and the Dover decision, there were at least three
circuit court decisions and one state court of appeals decision that pertain to the teaching of
alternative origins theories in public schools. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ.,
185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (enjoining a school board from requiring that a patently
religious disclaimer be read before the teaching of evolution in all elementary and secondary
school classes); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a teacher who challenged a school district requirement to teach "evolutionism"
failed to state a claim and that a school district could restrict a teacher from discussing
religion with students not only in class, but at other times during the school day); Webster v.
New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a school board's
prohibition of the teaching of an alternative theory of human origins did not violate a
teacher's First or Fourteenth Amendment rights); LeVake v. Indep. Sch. Dist. # 656, 625
N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a school board's decision to reassign a
teacher who refused to teach evolution did not violate the teacher's free exercise of religion
and that the teacher's right to free speech did not permit him to teach a biology class in a
manner that circumvented the curriculum prescribed by the school board).
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questioning its motivation behind the Act. 145 Scalia argued that, unless
legislation is wholly motivated by religious purpose, it cannot be invalid
under Lemon. 146 Finally, he argued that many secular statutes that serve the
public good are indeed motivated in part by religious ideals, that
"governmental actions undertaken with the specific intention of improving
the position of religion do not advance religion" under Lemon, and that, at
times, the government may, and at other times must, act to advance
religion. 147 Ultimately, Scalia would abandon Lemon's purpose prong. 148
Some commentators have disagreed with the theory underlying Edwards
but have taken a different view from that in Scalia's dissenting opinion.
For example, some have argued that Lemon's purpose prong should require
only a plausible secular purpose, meaning that a statute can be held to be
invalid under Lemon's purpose prong if its only plausible purpose is
religious.' 49 Under this theory, one commentator has argued that the
Edwards majority was "too skeptical of the proffered secular purpose" and
that the "secular plausibility" of the Creationism Act was difficult to
determine on its face, so the Court "should have allowed evidence to be
taken on the secular plausibility of the statute, rather than allowing the
matter to be disposed of by a motion for summary judgment before trial."'150
In other words, those who believed in creation on the basis of their religion
could have accepted the Creationism Act on the basis of their religious
values, while others who did not believe in creation could plausibly accept
the Act on the basis of the scientific evidence that was purported to support
creation science. However, this theory of Lemon's purpose prong
apparently failed to convince the Court in Edwards because the Court found
it unnecessary to factor the purported scientific evidence underlying
creation science into its analysis. 151
Other commentators argue that the Establishment Clause dictates that the
legislative process should be required to pass laws with an "express secular
purpose rather than merely a plausible one."' 152 Under this theory, the
constitutionality of a particular law turns "on the reasons that are apparent
in the political process" for passing the law. 153 Therefore, a religious
reason may underlie a particular law; however "[i]f [it] can be successfully
145. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 610-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 614-16 (internal quotations omitted).
148. Id. at 636-40. Judge Michael McConnell also has rejected "the principle of secular
rationale." See Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious
Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 639, 643.
149. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 Va. L. Rev. 87 (2002).
150. Id. at 149-50.
151. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale
L.J. 1611, 1622 (1993); see also Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free
and Democratic Society, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 677, 701 (1993) (arguing that positions on
law and public policy "should always have and be sufficiently motivated by adequate secular
reasons").
153. Greene, supra note 152, at 1623.
1038 (Vol. 75
RESOL VING THE CONTRO VERSY
translated into a secular one-if a nonbeliever sees the secular argument as
one made in good faith, and finds the ensuing debate meaningful-then the
concern with exclusion from political participation is eliminated.' 54 In this
regard, a law that is not facially religious and that is enacted for an
expressly secular purpose may violate the Establishment Clause if it is
found to be a pretext for a religious purpose. 155
The Supreme Court has arguably applied this theory when finding
impermissible purposes in Establishment Clause cases. 156 Most recently, in
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, Justice
David Souter wrote that "the purpose apparent from government action can
have an impact more significant than the result expressly decreed."'1 57 In
relying on the Court's prior jurisprudence, Souter reinforced the viewpoint
that a legislature will be afforded deference, but the "secular purpose
required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a
religious objective."' 158 Finally, Souter also acknowledged that if the
government hides religious motive so well that the "objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute," cannot see it, then without something more the government does
not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking
religious sides. A secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to
make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see whether
such government action turns out to have (as it may even be likely to
have) the illegitimate effect of advancing religion.159
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia dissented in McCreary County because he
found no support from the Court's prior cases for a heightened purpose
requirement. 160 Scalia found problematic the Court's concern that the
objective observer could be made to feel like an outsider of the political
community and therefore disagreed with the Court's apparent purpose
standard. 16 1 According to Scalia, under the Court's reasoning, "even if a
government could show that its actual purpose was not to advance religion,
it would presumably violate the Constitution as long as the Court's
objective observer would think otherwise."'162 While Scalia continued his
call to abandon Lemon's purpose prong, he argued that if the prong were to
remain, then at the most, it should require the Court only to identify a
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1624-25 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)); see also McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of
Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
157. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733.
158. Id. at 2735.
159. Id. (citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308).
160. Id. at 2757-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at2757.
162. Id.
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plausible secular purpose to avoid invalidating a particular law under the
Establishment Clause. 163
In light of this debate over the meaning of Lemon's purpose prong, it is
possible that a future court might decide that Lemon only requires a court to
identify a law's plausible secular purpose. Since proponents of intelligent
design argue that the theory is supported by scientific evidence, it can be
argued it satisfies the plausible secular purpose of fostering scientific debate
about human origins. 164 This debate adds complexity to the overall debate
as to whether teaching intelligent design in public schools would violate the
Establishment Clause. Part II of this Note reviews the arguments that have
been presented by legal commentators on both sides of this debate and
reviews the analysis undertaken by the court in Dover.
II. THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER WHETHER MANDATING THE SUBSTANTIVE
TEACHING OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS VIOLATES THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A number of legal commentators have weighed in on the debate as to
whether it is unconstitutional to mandate the substantive teaching of
intelligent design in public schools. This Part attempts to provide a
representative overview of the legal arguments that support or oppose such
a mandate. In addition, this Part reviews the court's analysis in Dover, the
only decision to date on the topic. Part III will critically analyze these
arguments on the way toward concluding that it is indeed unconstitutional
to substantively teach intelligent design in public schools.
A. Commentary Arguing that Substantively Teaching Intelligent Design in
Public Schools Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause
Stephen Marshall argues that a statute requiring instruction in intelligent
design would survive constitutional analysis because it would satisfy each
prong of the Lemon test. He argues that so long as the statute provides a
"legitimate secular purpose" of advancing the "scientific literacy by
teaching all of the evidence and explanatory theories," the statute would
satisfy the purpose prong.' 65  Marshall also concludes that requiring
instruction in intelligent design would not violate the effects prong of the
Lemon test because intelligent design "presupposes no supernatural
being[,]... cannot be discredited as unscientific[,] and.., differs distinctly
from creation science."1 66 Finally, Marshall contends that requiring the
163. Id. at 2758 n.9 (explaining that the Court has been "'reluctan[t] to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the
State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute."' (quoting Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983))).
164. See infra Part II.A.
165. Stephen L. Marshall, Note, When May a State Require Teaching Alternatives to the
Theory of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 Ky. L.J. 743, 768 (2002).
166. Id. at 772.
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teaching of intelligent design would not result in excessive government
entanglement in religion because intelligent design texts are "not replete
with religious concepts;" school personnel need not monitor discussions to
prohibit religious discussion because intelligent design "makes no claims
regarding religious issues;" and, if teachers are asked religious questions
that arise from the teaching of intelligent design, they can "explain that such
issues are theological in nature, and not scientific."' 167
Jeffrey Addicott argues that intelligent design "cannot be dismissed as
yet another back door attempt by creationists to get a sectarian religious
idea into the public schools."'168 Addicott contends that, notwithstanding
federal court decisions to the contrary, 169 "evolutionism" may be viewed as
a type of religion.' 70 In analyzing intelligent design using the Lemon test,
Addicott, like Marshall, concludes that teaching intelligent design "must be
presented in a way that is in keeping with the school's secular purpose of
providing students with critical thinking and excellence in education."''
Addicott argues that teaching intelligent design would not violate the
effects prong if the school is "not perceived as approving or advancing any
religious or non-religious viewpoint."' 172 Additionally, if the materials and
techniques used by the school to teach intelligent design, have no
"significant religious purpose and are non-discriminatory and secular in
nature," they would not violate Lemon's entanglement prong.' 73 Finally,
Addicott acknowledges that, "[a]t the end of the day, from a jurisprudential
standpoint, the crux of any Establishment Clause analysis revolves around
the matter of determining whether intelligent design theory is a religious-
based idea passed off as a scientific theory or a genuine scientific
theory."174
Addicott takes the position that intelligent design is not a religious-based
idea because intelligent design "passes" the three-part test for religion as it
appears in Alvarado v. San Jose,175 but that was originally proposed by
Judge Adams in Malnak.176 However, Addicott also argues that the Malnak
167. Id. at 784-85.
168. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon of Darwinism: Teaching the
Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1507,
1511 (2002).
169. See, e.g., supra note 144.
170. Addicott, supra note 168, at 1562-67.
171. Id. at 1579.
172. Id. at 1580.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1581 (citing Alvarado v. San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996)). In
similar analyses, David DeWolf and H. Wayne House previously found that intelligent
design does not constitute a religion under this test. See David K. DeWolf, Teaching the
Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 39, 84-85; H.
Wayne House, Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific Theories Survive
Constitutional Challenge?, 13 Regent U. L. Rev. 355, 438 (2001).
176. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text; see also Addicott, supra note 168, at
1581 n.436.
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test is "unworkable in the real world" because the line separating church
and state is "blurred" and therefore "must be weighed in the totality of the
circumstances." 17 7
Furthermore, Addicott contends that the Supreme Court is not likely to
endorse the argument that the "concept of anunnamed intelligent designer
would automatically qualify as a religious belief' and that if one were to
use the Court's discussion of the "supernatural creator" in Edwards as
support for such a contention, one would be "reading far too much into the
language."17 8
Francis Beckwith has written extensively to advocate that teaching
intelligent design in public schools is constitutional.179 Among Beckwith's
arguments is that intelligent design proponents "present a cluster of
premises that are not derived from any single religion's special
revelation... [and] these premises, if true, seem to support conclusions
contrary to materialism," and, therefore, intelligent design "offers the
promise to open up a serious public conversation, without sectarian rancor
or animus, on deep questions about who and what we are and the order and
nature of things."'180 Beckwith, like Addicott, Hall, and DeWolf, also
contends that intelligent design does not constitute a religion under the
three-part test first proposed in Malnak, but goes one step further in saying
that if intelligent design did qualify as religion under this test, then so
would evolution, because Beckwith views intelligent design as a theory that
addresses the same questions as evolution "but provides different
answers."' 181  In other words, Beckwith views intelligent design as
"lend[ing] plausibility and support to theism" and evolution as "lend[ing]
plausibility and support to some nontheisms."'182 Beckwith also argues that
teaching intelligent design in public schools will pass constitutional muster
under Edwards because it can be distinguished from Creationism and is not
explicitly religious. 183
Moreover, Beckwith proposes four "possible secular reasons" that would
validate the teaching of intelligent design in public schools.184 Relying on
the so-called endorsement test proposed in Lynch v. Donnelly,' 85 Beckwith
argues that "if a particular curriculum gives the impression that a certain
177. Addicott, supra note 168, at 1582.
178. Id. at 1583-84.
179. See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the
Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 461 (2003)
[hereinafter Beckwith, Public Education]; Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty
Years After McClean v. Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of
Intelligent Design, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 455 (2003) [hereinafter Beckwith, Science
and Religion].
180. Beckwith, Science and Religion, supra note 179, at 498.
181. Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 179, at 494-96.
182. Id. at495.
183. Id. at 500.
184. Id. at 501-14.
185. 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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disputed, irreligious point of view is favored-in this case, evolution and
ontological materialism-the state can argue that in order to erase that
perception, a statute requiring or permitting the teaching of [intelligent
design] is necessary."' 86 The second secular reason proposed by Beckwith
is that a statute requiring the teaching of intelligent design
could be justified on the basis of neutrality by arguing that to teach only
one theory of origins (evolution)-that presupposes a controversial
epistemology (methodological naturalism), entails a controversial
metaphysics (ontological materialism), and is antithetical to traditional
religious belief-the state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and
promoting irreligion, which it is constitutionally forbidden from doing. 187
The third purpose proposed by Beckwith is the importance of "exposing
students to reputable scholarship that critiques the methodological
naturalism behind evolution and the ontological materialism entailed by
it.' 188 Finally, Beckwith's fourth proposed purpose is that an intelligent
design statute "enhances and protects the academic freedom of teachers and
students who may suffer marginalization, hostility, and public ridicule
because of their support of [intelligent design] and/or doubts about the
veracity of the evolutionary paradigm.' 89
B. Jurisprudence and Commentary Arguing that Substantively Teaching
Intelligent Design in Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause
1. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District
To date, the only court to rule on the constitutionality of teaching
intelligent design in public schools is a Pennsylvania district court. 190 That
court, in Dover, held that a Dover Area School District policy (the
"Policy"), which required the reading of a statement on intelligent design
(the "Statement") to students in the ninth grade biology class at Dover High
School and that provided access to intelligent design textbooks in the
school's library, violated the Establishment Clause and therefore the court
permanently enjoined the Policy's implementation.191
186. Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 179, at 502.
187. Id. at 503.
188. Id. at 507.
189. Id. at 509.
190. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
191. Id. at 709, 766. The court also held that the Dover Area School District policy (the
"Policy") violated article 1, section 3 of the Pennsylvania constitution. Id. at 709, 764-65
(citing Pa. Const. Art. I, § 3). The Policy was enacted by a school board resolution that
stated "[s]tudents will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's theory and of other
theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design. Note: Origins of Life
is not taught." Id. at 708. Pursuant to this resolution, the Dover Area School District
required teachers to read the following statement (the "Statement") to the Dover High
School ninth-grade biology class:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's
Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of which evolution
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In reaching its decision, the court employed both the endorsement and
Lemon tests. 192 Applying the endorsement test, the court found that to the
reasonable observer, 193 the Policy constituted a government endorsement of
religion because the Policy favored a particular religious view, namely that
it espoused the creationist doctrine that a supernatural creator was
responsible for the origin of man. 194 The court viewed the intelligent
design movement as nothing more than the most recent chapter in a long
history of religious strategies to replace the teaching of evolution with that
of creationism. 195
In finding that intelligent design is a sham for creationism, the court was
highly persuaded by a number of factual findings. The court pointed to the
similarities between intelligent design and creationism and found that
"writings of leading [intelligent design] proponents reveal that the designer
postulated by their argument is the God of Christianity."' 196 The court also
cited evidence that Of Pandas and People, the textbook that was made
available to Dover students, defined creation science in early drafts the
same way it defined intelligent design in later drafts. 197 The court was also
persuaded by evidence that shortly after the publication of the Edwards
decision, Pandas was edited so that cognates of the word creation were
replaced with the phrase intelligent design. 198  Finally the court was
persuaded by evidence that many intelligent design proponents believe in
creationism and that their goal in developing intelligent design, as outlined
in the so-called "Wedge Strategy," is to "replace science as currently
practiced with theistic and Christian science." 199
The court concluded its endorsement test analysis by finding that the
Statement that was read to Dover students in biology class impermissibly
is a part. Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new
evidence is discovered. The theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for
which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that
unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from
Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for
students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent
Design actually involves.
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and their
families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses upon preparing
students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.
Id. at 708-09.
192. See id. at 712.
193. The court conducted the endorsement test from the perspectives of both the ninth-
grade students to whom the intelligent design statement was directed and the adults who
received a school newsletter that contained the statement. Id. at 723-35.
194. See id. at 716-35.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 719.
197. Id. at 721.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 719-20 (internal quotations omitted).
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endorsed a religious viewpoint.200 In addition, the court found that a
newsletter circulated by the Dover Area School District to every household
in Dover was also an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.20 1 The
newsletter sparked reaction from the community in the form of over two
hundred letters to the editor and editorials in two local newspapers. 202 On
the basis of these responses, the court found that "the entire [Dover]
community became intertwined in the controversy [over] the [intelligent
design] Policy at issue and that the community collectively perceive[d] the
[intelligent design] Policy as favoring a particular religious view."20 3
Accordingly, the court held that the implementation of the intelligent design
Policy was "a strong endorsement of a religious view" from both the
perspective of "an objective student and an objective adult member of the
Dover community. '204
Before moving to its application of the Lemon test, the court discussed
why it found that intelligent design is not science. Initially, the court noted
that intelligent design "arguments may be true" but that it was not taking a
position on that proposition.20 5 The court then proceeded to explain that
intelligent design fails as a science because it invokes and permits
supernatural causation; the proposition of irreducible complexity utilizes
the same dualism that previous courts found illogical and flawed; intelligent
design has not generated peer-reviewed studies and has not been subject to
empirical testing and research; and every major scientific association that
has taken a position on whether intelligent design is science has concluded
that it is not science. 206
The court concluded its Establishment Clause analysis by applying the
Lemon test. Applying the purpose prong, the court reviewed the legislative
history of the intelligent design Policy, as well as the Board's public
statements with respect to the Policy. 20 7 The court specifically rejected the
School District's argument that the intelligent design Policy was
implemented for the secular purpose of improving science education and
critical thinking skills because the court found that the legislative history of
the School Board's Policy revealed its religious purpose and because
members of the Board who voted for implementing the Policy conceded
that they did not understand intelligent design.20 8
200. Id. at 725-29 (finding that the Statement disavowed evolutionary theory and
endorsed intelligent design (1) by telling students evolution was being taught because it was
required by state academic standards and that it was "just a theory"; (2) by directing students
to Pandas for an alternative explanation without a similar cautionary note; and (3) by
referring students to talk with their families about the origins of life to remind them that they
can hold on to beliefs taught by their parents that conflict with evolution).
201. Id. at 729-35.
202. Id. at 733.
203. Id. at 734.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 735.
206. Id. at 735-46.
207. Id. at 746-63.
208. Id.
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The court also found that the intelligent design Policy violated Lemon's
effects prong because, if intelligent design was not science, the only real
effect it could have was to advance religion.20 9 In addition, the court found
that the intelligent design Statement had the effect of bolstering religious
theories of origins while undermining evolution. 210
2. Commentary Arguing that Substantively Teaching Intelligent Design in
Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause
Jay Wexler was among the first to argue that teaching intelligent design
substantively in public schools would violate the Establishment Clause.21'
To support his view, Wexler argues that under either a "content-based"
definition of religion or a "functional" definition of religion, intelligent
design would constitute a religious doctrine. 212 Wexler contends that the
Edwards Court followed a content-based definition of religion by
describing the teaching of creation science as advancing the religious belief
in a "'supernatural being"' or "'supernatural creator."' 213  Wexler also
argues that intelligent design closely resembles the creation science at issue
in Edwards because the creator espoused by creation science was also
unnamed. 214 Wexler contends that intelligent design would also satisfy a
functional definition of religion, which he argues was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Seeger, because intelligent design seeks to address
"fundamental questions [about] the origins and meaning of life and our role
in the universe." 215 Finally, Wexler argues that intelligent design endorses
"a specific strain of conservative Christianity--one characterized by a
century-old tradition of attacking evolution." 216
Many commentators have agreed with Wexler's view that intelligent
design is a sham for creationism. For example, Matthew Brauer, Barbara
209. Id. at 764.
210. Id.
211. See Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution
Controversy in Public Schools, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 751, 831 (2003) [hereinafter Wexler,
Darwin]; Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 439
(1997) [hereinafter Wexler, Pandas].
212. Wexler, Pandas, supra note 211, at 459 ("[A] content-based definition might define
religion as a belief in a god [and] would include Christianity but would perhaps exclude such
Eastern religions as Taoism[, and] [flunctional definitions define religion not by the content
of a belief, but instead in terms of the role the belief plays in a person's life ....
213. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987)).
214. Id. at 459-60 (citing Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591-92).
215. Id. at 460-61.
216. Id. at 463. According to Wexler, intelligent design "resembles in very important
ways the biblical story of creation literally interpreted," makes "the denial of evolution a
necessary corollary of a belief in intelligent design," attacks evolution in the same way as
creationists, represents a shift in the strategy of the creationist movement analogous to the
shift in strategy between Epperson and Edwards, and is compatible with the long history of
Christian thought that "assert[s] the notion that the complexity of nature lends support to a
belief in God." Id. at 464-65.
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Forrest,2 17 and Steven Gey have recently argued intelligent design is
nothing less than a sham for creationism and that design theorists have
specifically formulated intelligent design as a means for circumventing the
holdings of Epperson and Edwards.218 Diana Rosenberg and Douglas
Stewart have advanced similar arguments. 219 In addition, Deborah Ruele
has equated intelligent design with creationism because it "extends beyond
the scope of a scientific explanation for the origins of the earth [by]
incorporat[ing] specific Christian monotheistic themes." 220
Wendy Hanakahi has argued that teaching intelligent design in public
school would violate the Lemon test.221 Hanakahi argues that intelligent
design constitutes a religion because it posits a creator and is likely a sham
for the Christian version of creationism.222 In addition, she argues that
teaching intelligent design would fail the endorsement test.223 Finally, she
argues that teaching intelligent design in public schools would fail the
coercion test because it would require mandatory participation. 224
Theresa Wilson agrees that intelligent design should not be taught in
public schools but argues that if intelligent design qualifies as science,
under a Lemon analysis its teaching would be constitutional. 225 However,
Wilson argues that intelligent design does not meet any of the four criteria
that she contends are necessary for constituting a scientific theory-whether
a theory is logical, empirically testable, sociological in that it resolves
"recognized problems, paradoxes, and/or anomalies irresolvable on the
217. Forrest testified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Dover. See Transcript of
Trial, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d. 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 04-
CV-2688), available at http://www2.ncseweb.org/kvd/trans/2005-1005-day6-am.pdf. The
court in Dover was particularly persuaded by her testimony. See Dover, 400 F. Supp. 2d at
719-23, 745.
218. See generally Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest & Steven G. Gey, Is it Science
Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the Constitution, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (2005)
(detailing the history of the intelligent design movement and arguing it grew out of an effort
to circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Edwards).
219. Diana M. Rosenberg, Note, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection: Opening the
Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of Darwinism, 9 J.L. & Pol'y 611,
614 (2001) (arguing intelligent design is a form of creationism); Douglas E. Stewart, Jr.,
Note, Going Back in Time: How the Kansas Board of Education's Removal of Evolution
from the State Curriculum Violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, 20 Rev.
Litig. 549, 556 (2001) (describing intelligent design as a variant of creationism).
220. Deborah A. Ruele, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The Establishment Clause
and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in the Public Schools, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2555,
2561 (2001).
221. Wendy F. Hanakahi, Evolution-Creationism Debate: Evaluating the
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in Public School Classrooms, 25 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 9, 31-41 (2002).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 41-42 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
224. Id. at 42-45 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992)).
225. Theresa Wilson, Evolution, Creation, and Naturally Selecting Intelligent Design Out
of the Public Schools, 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 203, 240 (2003) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997)).
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basis of pre-existing scientific theories," and historical. 226 In short, Wilson
argues that intelligent design is logically inconsistent because it fails to
identify the intelligent designer, is not empirically testable, is not
sociological, and is not historical because, "[a]t best, intelligent design
supporters point out alleged weaknesses in evolution theory and try to fill
the gaps with a designer" but "fail to articulate any mechanism used by the
designer, thus providing no better explanation for the origin of life." 227
Accordingly, Wilson concludes that "[i]ntelligent design is not simply bad
science; it is religion camouflaged as bad science" and "religiously-based
bad science" can be "excluded from the public schools on constitutional
grounds." 228
More recently, Anne Marie Lofaso has argued intelligent design does not
constitute science because "it is not falsifiable and is not subject to revision
by testing; it has no predictive value; and it relies on supernatural rather
than natural explanations for the natural world. '229 Lofaso concludes that
since intelligent design is nothing more than a "religious inference for the
existence of God," it would be unconstitutional and bad policy to allow its
teaching in public school science class.230 In addition, Lofaso cautions that
proponents of intelligent design are seeking to attack methodological
naturalism and that attempts to change the definition of science to
accommodate the invocation of supernatural causation would "end
progress" and "strangle academic freedom." 231
Some commentators argue that intelligent design violates the
Establishment Clause but that a new standard is necessary to appropriately
analyze proposed alternative origins theories. For example, Charles Kitcher
has offered an "honest purpose and substantial reliability" standard that is
somewhat of a hybrid of Lemon's purpose prong and the Daubert standard
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. 232 Under Kitcher's proposed
standard, even if a proposed curriculum "contains some religious purpose,"
it can nevertheless withstand constitutional challenge if it has a "substantial
secular purpose" and is "sufficiently scientific under Daubert review."233
In applying his proposed standard to, among other examples, the facts of
Dover, Kitcher finds that the school board "demonstrated an impermissibly
religious purpose" and that because intelligent design is "untestable,
226. Id. at 234.
227. Id. at 235.
228. Id. at 240.
229. Anne Marie Lofaso, Does Changing the Definition of Science Solve the
Establishment Clause Problem for Teaching Intelligent Design as Science in Public
Schools? Doing an End-Run Around the Constitution, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 219, 266 (2006); see
also Kirwin, supra note 11, at 698-702 (offering similar arguments for why intelligent
design is not science).
230. Lofaso, supra note 229, at 268-71.
231. Id. at 277.
232. Charles Kitcher, Lawful Design: A New Standard for Evaluating Establishment
Clause Challenges to School Science Curricula, 39 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 451, 457
(2006) (citing Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
233. Id. at 489.
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unsupported in the peer review literature, and rejected by the scientific
community, it is insufficiently reliable under Daubert.''234
Similarly, a Harvard Law Review "Recent Cases" piece examines the
Dover decision and argues that the problem was not that the school board
acted with religious motives or that the implementation of its Policy lacked
a secular purpose or effect; rather the problem was that "the government's
use of religion" led to "strife, alienation, and divisiveness. '235  This
commentary argues that such a standard is superior to the Lemon and
endorsement tests because deciphering purpose and effect has proved
nebulous in prior Establishment Clause cases and divisiveness may have
been one of the framers' primary concerns in drafting the Establishment
Clause. 236 Accordingly, the commentary argues that the intelligent design
Policy in Dover should have been found unconstitutional because the Policy
created "intense, genuine 'discord in the community.' ' 237
C. Arguments that Intelligent Design Could Be Taught in Public Schools in
Limited Circumstances
Although Wexler has argued that intelligent design is a sham for
creationism and that teaching intelligent design as true in a public school
science class would be unconstitutional, he has also proposed that the
"intelligent design-evolution controversy"238 could be taught in a social
studies setting where the purpose of the class was to "teach about religious
views on origins so that students can at least understand the perspective of
religious people when they reject scientific theories like evolution that
conflict with religious claims. '239 Such courses, according to Wexler,
should not "try to make nonreligious students question their own views but
rather should help students understand why religious people think the way
they do about origins." 240
Todd Olin agrees with Wexler that social studies teachers could present
the content of intelligent design in the context of the debate surrounding
alternative origins theories or a survey of religious views without endorsing
the merits of the theory.24 1 In addition, Olin argues that science teachers
can acknowledge intelligent design as a competing religious theory to
evolution so long as they do not present the merits of the theory because
234. Id. at 490-91.
235. Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Establishment Clause-Middle District of
Pennsylvania Holds that the Teaching of Intelligent Design Violates the Establishment
Clause-Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005),
119 Harv. L. Rev. 2268, 2270 (2006).
236. Id. at 2270-73.
237. Id. at 2275 (quoting Dover, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 762).
238. Wexler, Darwin, supra note 211, at 822.
239. Id. at 786.
240. Id.
241. Todd R. Olin, Note, Fruit of the Poison Tree: A First Amendment Analysis of the
History and Character of Intelligent Design Education, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1107, 1145-46
(2006) (citing Wexler, Darwin, supra note 211, at 787, 793, 848).
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describing religious views is permissible while advancing them is not.242
Furthermore, Olin argues that concepts upon which intelligent design is
based could be taught in a secular way to public school science students. 243
For example, Olin argues that the concept of irreducible complexity could
be presented as a permissible criticism of evolution without running afoul
of the Establishment Clause but that irreducible complexity could not be
taught as evidence of an intelligent designer. 244  According to Olin,
"[taking this conclusory step espouses a religious view. '245
Kent Greenawalt takes a middle-ground position by arguing that while
"[t]eaching intelligent design is religious if that theory is presented as true
or as the alternative to dominant evolutionary theory," it would nevertheless
be permissible if students were "informed of uncertainties and possible gaps
in dominant evolutionary theory and told that, if any supplements are
needed... intelligent design is one conceivable alternative. '246
The foregoing demonstrates that regardless of whether there is a
scientific controversy over the origins of life, there is certainly a legal
controversy over whether mandating the substantive teaching of intelligent
design in public school would be constitutional. Part III of this Note
attempts to resolve this controversy by briefly explaining why some of
these arguments present a good starting point for analyzing the
constitutionality of teaching intelligent design, and why others are
fundamentally flawed. Building on the strengths of some of these
arguments, this Note argues that intelligent design does indeed qualify as a
religion for Establishment Clause purposes and discusses why intelligent
design cannot be taught as a valid scientific theory in public schools for any
secular purpose. Part III contends that although it may be constitutionally
permissible to describe intelligent design in public schools without
endorsing or disputing its merits, it would be difficult to do so without
provoking a fact-intensive constitutional challenge. Therefore, Part III
recommends that if public school teachers are asked about intelligent
design, they should inform students that some people believe in religious
understandings of human origins, and students should turn to their families
or places of worship to learn about those understandings.
III. MANDATING THE SUBSTANTIVE TEACHING OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS WOULD VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Part III of this Note argues that the teaching of intelligent design in
public schools violates the Establishment Clause because the theory of
intelligent design is an inherently religious doctrine and not science.
242. Id. at 1144-45.
243. Id. at 1143-46.
244. Id. at 1144.
245. Id.
246. Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design, 17 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 321, 322 (2003) (emphasis
omitted).
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Accordingly, intelligent design cannot be substantively taught in public
schools for any secular purpose. Intelligent design is the theory that life is
too complex to have evolved by way of natural selection and therefore must
have been intelligently designed. Intelligent design rests on three tenets-
that complexity in nature is empirically measurable, that natural processes
are incapable of explaining the complexity found in nature, and that
intelligent design best explains such complexity. 247 By definition, design is
not possible without a designer. Although intelligent design does not
identify the designer responsible for designing life, the theory nonetheless
requires that some form of intelligent designer, cause, or agent exists for the
theory to hold water. In other words, under intelligent design, design and
designer are inextricably linked. Moreover, not only is the intelligent
designer undefined under the theory, it is deemed unnatural and
unobserved.248  Therefore, this Note argues that the quintessential
prerequisite to accepting that design exists in nature is accepting not only
that an intelligent designer exists outside of nature, but also that the
designer is responsible for the design observed in nature. While courts have
struggled with defining the term religion as it appears in the Establishment
Clause, 249 the proposition that an unobserved and unnatural intelligent
designer exists external to the natural world would satisfy any definition of
religion that courts have used. Therefore, intelligent design is an inherently
religious doctrine for constitutional purposes.
Having established that intelligent design qualifies as a religious
doctrine, this Part demonstrates that intelligent design cannot be taught in a
secular way so as to allow its substantive teaching in public schools.
Indeed, intelligent design proponents argue that "methodological
naturalism" is insufficient for empirically testing the theory and that "non-
materialistic" methods are required to teach intelligent design.250
Consequently, one cannot rationally accept the theory of intelligent design
as true by way of secular means-intelligent design can only be accepted as
true after one believes in the existence of an intelligent designer.
Accordingly, Part III argues that mandating the substantive teaching of
intelligent design in public schools is unconstitutional.
In addition, Part III demonstrates that intelligent design may represent an
attempt at a new paradigm whereby theological considerations can be
subjected to empirical testing. Such a paradigm cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny because it will inevitably advance or inhibit religion
by subjecting general tenets of religious faith to empirical proof or disproof.
Finally, Part III recommends that if public school teachers are asked
about intelligent design, they can avoid running afoul of the constitution by
informing students that some people believe in religious understandings of
247. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part I.B.
250. See supra Parts I.A.2, II.A.
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human origins, and students should turn to their families or places of
worship to learn about those understandings.
A. Intelligent Design Constitutes Religion Under Any Constitutional
Definition of Religion
The goal of intelligent design is not only to detect design in nature, but
also to demonstrate that such evidence of design signals the existence of an
unnatural intelligent designer outside of nature. While the intelligent
designer is not directly observed, its handiwork is the best explanation for
the design we may observe in nature.251 Design theorists concede the
inherently religious nature of this proposition but argue that the theory is
not religious because it does not attempt to identify the designer.252
However, for constitutional purposes, if intelligent design is theistic,
regardless of whether or not it espouses a particular sectarian version of
theism, it is religious. Therefore, to demonstrate why intelligent design
would qualify as a religion, it is necessary to demonstrate that the intelligent
designer is a "Creator" of man.
Design theorists expressly distinguish intelligent design from the
theological doctrine of creation. As described earlier, design theorists such
as Dembski claim,
Intelligent design as a scientific theory is distinct from a theological
doctrine of creation. Creation presupposes a Creator who originates the
world and all its materials. Intelligent design attempts only to explain the
arrangement of materials within an already given world. Design theorists
argue that certain arrangements of matter, especially in biological
systems, clearly signal a designing intelligence. 253
However, this statement is fundamentally misleading because it suggests
that the designer is not a "Creator," just an arranger of already existing
materials. If intelligent design is to hold together, the designer must have
"created" human beings. If Dembski is implying that the designer did not
create human beings, then intelligent design would fail because according
to the theory, life is "irreducibly complex" and could not have naturally
arisen from functionless biological precursors.254 Therefore, the only way
for Dembski's statement to comport with design theory is if the intelligent
designer discovered a world with functionless biological material that had
no chance of forming life as we now know it without intelligent
intervention. If this were true, then the intelligent designer "created" life by
arranging the material into a living configuration. In contrast, if human
beings already existed in Dembski's "given world," there would have been
nothing left for the designer to design.
251. See supra notes 18, 34-37 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
253. Dembski, supra note 18, at 248.
254. See supra notes 18, 21-28 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, intelligent design posits a theistic conception of man's
creation, although it does not necessarily identify any particular religious
sect's version of the creator. The Supreme Court's definitions of religion
all recognize man's relationship to a supernatural or extra-human creator as
religious. 255 While the Court's early decisions demonstrated a limited view
of religion that only included theistic beliefs, 256 its later decisions expanded
the definition of religion to include nontheistic beliefs. 257 Nonetheless,
consistent throughout the Court's decisions is the finding that man's belief
in a supernatural creator-whether that creator is God,258 a "Supreme
Being,"259 a "supernatural creator," or an "intelligent mind"26 0 -is a
religious belief.261 In other words, the broadening of the Court's language
over time regarding the identity of man's creator demonstrates that it is not
necessary to identify the creator as belonging to a particular religious sect.
Moreover, as Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in Edwards,
"'[c]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are
manifestly religious .... These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely
because they are presented as philosophy or as a science."'' 262 Therefore,
design proponents may claim that intelligent design fails to identify the
creator on the theory that the task should be left to religion or
philosophy; 263 however, intelligent design still can constitute religion for
constitutional purposes.
While many commentators agree with this viewpoint, most go further
and argue that intelligent design is a sham for the conservative Christian
interpretation of creationism.2 64  However, it is not necessary to
demonstrate that intelligent design endorses the views of a particular
religious sect. Furthermore, even if proponents of intelligent design are
conservative Christians who endorse creationism, that fact alone would not
be sufficient to demonstrate that intelligent design is a sham for
creationism. 265  It is more important for constitutional purposes that
255. See supra Part I.B. 1.
256. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
258. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
259. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
260. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987).
261. This formulation of religion is also consistent with "a reference to an extrahuman
source of value," which Abner Greene notes has been "[b]y far the most common criterion
mentioned by scholars as definitive of 'religion."' Greene, supra note 152, at 1617 & n.25
(citing numerous scholars supporting this view).
262. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F.
Supp. 1284, 1322 (D. N.J. 1977), affd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)).
263. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 211-20 and accompanying text. The court in Dover reached the
same conclusion. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718-723
(M.D. Pa. 2005).
265. But see Brauer, Forrest & Gey, supra note 218, at 74 ("Another significant
indication of [Intelligent Design's] creationist identity is support by other creationists, who
recognize it as creationism and share its goals.").
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intelligent design posits an inherently religious theory, not that its
proponents belong to a particular religious sect.
Interestingly, most commentators argue that intelligent design is not a
religious-based idea because intelligent design "passes" the three-part test
for religion proposed by Judge Adams in Malnak.266 However, Judge
Adams demonstrated in Africa v. Pennsylvania that he considers the
recognition of a Supreme Being or reference to a "transcendental or all-
controlling force" as religious.267 In contrast, he expressly used evolution
as an example of what would not constitute religion under the test.268 If a
court were to "look[] to the familiar religions as models in order to
ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is
confronting the same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as
unquestioned and accepted 'religions,' ' 269 the court would likely find that
the required belief in the existence of an unnatural intelligent designer of
life is analogous to formal religions. The fact that design theorists have to
expressly distinguish the theory from the theological doctrine of creation
demonstrates that it is reasonable to draw such an analogy.
Furthermore, if SCI/TM qualified as a religion under Adams's test, then
it is reasonable to conclude intelligent design would as well. Intelligent
design, like SCI/TM, answers ultimate truths including "the nature both of
world and man, the underlying sustaining force of the universe," could
represent a "basis of everything," and similar to how meditation is
"presented as a means for contacting this 'impelling life force,"' 270
detecting design is the means for detecting the presence of the designer.
Accordingly, intelligent design would satisfy Adams's definition of
religion.
Having demonstrated that intelligent design constitutes a religion for
constitutional purposes, it becomes necessary to determine whether the
mandated substantive teaching of intelligent design in public schools
violates the Establishment Clause. Part III.B of this Note demonstrates that
it does because it is not possible to teach intelligent design substantively in
public schools for any secular purpose and Part III.C will demonstrate that
substantively teaching intelligent design will inevitably advance or inhibit
religion.
266. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208-09 (Adams, J., concurring); see supra notes 175-77, 181-82
and accompanying text.
267. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033 (3d Cir. 1981).
268. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring); see also Peloza v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding "evolutionism" is not a
religion).
269. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams, J., concurring).
270. Id. at 213.
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B. Intelligent Design Cannot Be Taught Substantively in Public Schools for
Any Secular Purpose
1. Intelligent Design Fails Lemon's Purpose Prong as Applied in Edwards
Many commentators contend that because the Edwards Court stated that
"teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to
schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of
enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction," 271 intelligent design
may be validly taught in public schools because it arguably constitutes a
valid scientific theory.272 This argument misapplies the Court's statement.
In making this statement, the Court acknowledged that if a law's actual
purpose were to foster scientific debate about competing theories of human
origins, the Court would not foreclose teaching critiques of evolution so
long as those critiques were scientific and not motivated by a religious
purpose.273
However, under Edwards, even if a law's stated secular purpose were to
foster scientific debate, if such purpose were a pretext for a religious
purpose, it would be unconstitutional. In other words, Edwards suggests it
may not be possible to teach a religious doctrine that opposes evolution for
a genuine secular purpose, a suggestion that has been debated among legal
commentators. For example, as discussed earlier, a number of
commentators have argued that intelligent design is nothing more than a
sham for the conservative Christian interpretation of creationism,274 while
others such as Francis Beckwith have attempted to challenge this
conclusion by proposing four "possible secular reasons" that would validate
the teaching of intelligent design in public schools. 275
However, it is likely that each of these secular reasons would fail under
Edwards. The first of Beckwith's secular reasons, while grounded under
the Court's endorsement test, assumes that the sole teaching of evolution
constitutes an existing Establishment Clause violation and, accordingly,
intelligent design is needed to cure that violation.276 However, as described
earlier, Epperson and Edwards make clear that evolution constitutes no
such violation. 277 Furthermore, according to at least two federal courts,
evolution does not constitute a religion.278
271. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).
272. See supra notes 165-89 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, the scientific
validity of intelligent design is the subject of intense debate. See supra note 29. This Note
will take issue with the scientific nature of intelligent design infra Part III.B.2.
273. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593-94.
274. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part I.C.
278. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring);
Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Beckwith's second secular reason is to neutralize the teaching of
evolution because evolution is "antithetical to traditional religious
belief. '279 However, this is a principle that both the Edwards and Epperson
Courts rejected: "[T]here can be no legitimate state interest in protecting
particular religions from scientific views 'distasteful to them' [and] 'the
First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and
learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious
sect or dogma.' 280
With respect to Beckwith's third secular reason of teaching students
"reputable scholarship," 281 no mandate is necessary to expose students to
valid secular scholarship. 282 Therefore, like academic freedom, this is a
nonstarter. Lastly, notwithstanding the Court's ruling in Edwards,
Beckwith argues that academic freedom could be a valid secular purpose
for teaching a religious doctrine in public schools. 283 Edwards, however,
makes clear that no mandate is necessary to provide teachers with the
freedom to teach subjects that do not violate the Establishment Clause or
state or local curriculum requirements.2 84
As discussed earlier, Stephen Marshall also disagrees with the
proposition that intelligent design is a sham for creationism. 285 If Marshall
is correct in his view that intelligent design constitutes a valid scientific
theory and not a religious doctrine, then there would be no need for a court
to reach the constitutional issue of whether intelligent design could be
taught in public schools for a secular purpose.
On the other hand, while Jeffrey Addicott concludes that teaching
intelligent design "must be presented in a way that is in keeping with the
school's secular purpose of providing students with critical thinking and
excellence in education," 286 he acknowledges that "[a]t the end of the day,
from a jurisprudential standpoint, the crux of any Establishment Clause
analysis revolves around the matter of determining whether intelligent
design theory is a religious-based idea passed off as a scientific theory or a
genuine scientific theory. '287
Addicott's statement succinctly summarizes the hurdle proponents of
intelligent design would have to overcome in light of Edwards, namely that
mandating the teaching of intelligent design in public schools requires the
demonstration of an actual secular purpose. Under this standard, once a
court finds that intelligent design constitutes a religious doctrine, the court
only has to determine whether the stated purpose of teaching intelligent
279. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
280. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-91 (1987) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas,
303 U.S. 97, 106, 107 (1968)).
281. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
284. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587.
285. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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design is a pretext for a religious purpose. This Note has argued that, under
Edwards, intelligent design as a religious doctrine cannot be taught
alongside or in place of evolution for a secular purpose that is not a pretext
for a religious purpose. Other commentators have gone further to argue that
intelligent design is a sham for the conservative Christian interpretation of
creationism.
However, the foregoing raises a difficult question-if a court were only
to require a plausible secular purpose for mandating the teaching of
intelligent design in public schools, would it pass constitutional muster? If
a court only required a plausible secular purpose, the relationship of
intelligent design to creationism becomes less important to the analysis, and
the issue of whether the theory is scientifically valid becomes more
important. In other words, mandating the teaching of intelligent design in
public schools might be constitutional even if it is motivated by religious
purpose if it nonetheless fosters scientific debate about human origins.
However, the following section argues this can never be the case because
intelligent design, as a religious doctrine, cannot be successfully translated
into a secular scientific discourse that would allow nonbelievers to accept
the theory as plausible.
2. Intelligent Design Cannot Be Endorsed as a Valid Scientific Theory of
Origins in Public Schools Because Intelligent Design Is Not Science
This section does not critique the particulars of the scientific
underpinnings of intelligent design theory. For example, this section does
not enter the debate over whether or not the bacterial flagellum is structured
in such a way that it could not have evolved over time and therefore was
intelligently designed.288 Debating such particulars assumes that intelligent
design is debatable in scientific terms. Instead, this section argues that
intelligent design is not debatable in scientific terms precisely because
intelligent design is an attempt to change those terms. This means that
intelligent design is more than an alternative theory of origins; it is an
attempt to reformulate science in a way that allows the use of religion to
explain patterns found in nature.
Recall Dembski's description:
Intelligent design is a two-pronged approach for eradicating naturalism.
On the one hand, intelligent design presents a scientific and philosophical
critique of naturalism .... The other prong of intelligent design is a
positive scientific research program. As a positive research program,
intelligent design is a scientific discipline that systematically investigates
the effects of intelligent causes.289
Design proponents wish to eradicate naturalistic explanations of scientific
data and, in their place, inject religious explanations. In this way, teaching
288. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
289. Dembski, supra note 18, at 119.
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intelligent design teaches religion under the guise of scientific discovery.
At its core, intelligent design identifies patterns found in nature that it
claims cannot be explained by way of evolution and that therefore signal the
presence of design. Under the theory, such presence of design must be the
result of an intelligent designer. 290
However, once a particular pattern found in nature is labeled "design,"
the pattern's description is no longer scientific. The only way to accept that
the pattern was actually. designed is to believe that there exists an intelligent
designer, because by definition, design and designer are inextricably linked.
Since intelligent design rejects a priori any naturalistic explanation of the
pattern, intelligent design is not subject to alternative explanation.
Assume a student who does not believe in a supernatural creator of man
is presented with a pattern found in nature. The student is told that the
pattern exhibits scientific evidence of design. Without believing in the
existence of a designer, the student cannot accept this explanation as true,
and, because naturalism cannot explain design, the student cannot challenge
the explanation or present an alternative explanation. The inquiry ends
before it begins for the nonbeliever. Recall Michael Behe's description of
intelligent design: "To a person who does not feel obligated to restrict his
search to unintelligent causes, the straightforward conclusion is that many
biochemical systems were designed."' 291  Therefore, if the student is
"obligated to restrict his search to unintelligent causes" because he does not
maintain the religious belief that man was created by a supernatural
intelligent cause, he cannot accept the conclusion that the pattern he has
been presented with constitutes evidence of intelligent design.
Accordingly, religious faith is the quintessential prerequisite for accepting
the theory of intelligent design as true.
It is important here to distinguish intelligent design's description of
design in nature from the interpretation that natural selection constitutes a
form of design. For example, Stuart Kauffmann notes,
Darwin was himself inheritor of the tradition of Natural Theology, a
tradition in which organisms were considered to have been constructed by
the agency of God. This tradition focused on the design of organisms,
their intimate meeting, and the matching of their traits to their
environments, all as evidence of a higher purpose and intelligence....
Powerfully inimical to the theological consequences, Darwin's notion of
natural selection can be enthroned in God's stead as the creative
agency.29
2
However, while natural selection can be interpreted as being consistent with
God's creative agency,293 one does not have to adopt this interpretation of
290. See supra Part I.A.
291. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
292. Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in
Evolution 11 (1993).
293. Arguably, the Vatican has traditionally adopted this position. In 1996, Pope John
Paul II affirmed the position Pope Pius XI took in 1950 by recognizing "evolution as more
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natural selection to accept it as the mechanism of evolution. For example,
natural selection is not a mystical, supernatural force that drives evolution.
Natural selection is the method by which scientists explain how organisms
develop and lose traits over time as a function of their interaction with a
changing environment. It is a paradigm for describing the phenomenology
of life, not for explaining the purpose of life. For example, it attempts to
describe the existence of life; the variety of life; distinct and shared traits
across species; the changing of traits. over time including the loss of traits
and the persistence of others; the persistence of traits from generation to
generation by way of reproduction; death; migration and domains of
species; apparent competition for resources by species; parasitic and
symbiotic relationships between species; the food web; reproduction; the
relationship of organism size to the number of individuals and progeny
within a particular species; and the role of DNA in the transfer of traits from
generation to generation.294 All of these phenomena are observable in the
natural world and explainable by natural mechanisms. 295
Therefore, by explaining that certain traits are selected for or against,
natural selection does not necessarily mean that a higher intelligence is
responsible. It means that the survival or extinction of those traits over time
can be explained by the way in which those traits interacted with their
environment over time. What we view today as the appearance of
directionality or selection may really be an emergent property of a highly
complex system.296 Accordingly, evolution can be explained and debated
within the ambit of empirical observation of the natural world, a method
that requires no reference to a higher authority.
The same cannot be said for intelligent design. On the surface,
intelligent design claims that design is empirically detectable. As scientists
understand empirical observation, it means that one can formulate a
hypothesis and then go out into the natural world and objectively observe
an event in order to test the hypothesis. Once data are collected, inferences
and conclusions about the meaning of the data are drawn. Before the data
are analyzed, the scientist does not know whether the data will confirm or
than a hypothesis." See Message from Pope John Paul II to Pontifical Academy of Sciences,
Magisterium Is Concerned with Question of Evolution, for It Involves Conception of Man
(Oct. 22, 1996), available at http://www.its.caltech.edu/--nmcenter/sci-cp/evolution.html.
More recently, Rev. George Coyne, the Vatican's chief astronomer wrote,
If they respect the results of modem science, and indeed the best of modem
biblical research, religious believers must move away from the notion of a dictator
God or a designer God, a Newtonian God who made the universe as a watch that
ticks along regularly.... God in his infinite freedom continuously creates a world
that reflects that freedom at all levels of the evolutionary process to greater and
greater complexity.... He is not continually intervening, but rather allows,
participates, loves.
Vatican Official, supra note 5.
294. Yaneer Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems 534-36 (1997) (proposing a theory
of evolutionary dynamics).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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refute his hypothesis. In fact, science allows for the unexpected, and it is
usually when the unexpected occurs that the greatest discoveries are
made.297
However, detecting design in nature is not empirical-it involves
rendering a subjective conclusion about a particular pattern found in nature
before one actually observes it. Intelligent design argues that certain
biological structures could not have evolved over time because if they were
reduced to some less complex structure, they would lose their present
function. However, intelligent design only observes these structures at one
point in time, in relation to a particular function, and in relation to a
particular environment. Anything observed at one point in time in relation
to the function it performs at that time within a particular environment may
have the appearance of design, but that does not mean it actually was
designed. Intelligent design, by definition, does not acknowledge that the
structure, during prior generations, may have maintained different structures
with different functions or may not have existed at all within the larger
organism. In contrast, evolution, among other things, specifically examines
how organisms have changed over time in relation to changes in their
environment. Therefore, intelligent design, unlike evolution, is not
empirically detectable.
If intelligent design cannot be explained by naturalistic means, and if
detecting design cannot be empirically tested, then one cannot conclude
design exists without believing that an intelligent designer exists outside of
nature. Accordingly, intelligent design cannot successfully accommodate
acceptance by nonbelievers because it cannot be translated into a secular
scientific discourse. As a result, mandating intelligent design's substantive
teaching cannot have any plausible secular purpose because intelligent
design is simply not accessible to nonbelievers and does not truly foster
scientific debate about human origins.298
297. Consider, for example, Sir Alexander Fleming's discovery of penicillin, which
occurred after he left culture plates containing staphylococci bacteria unwashed while he
went on vacation. See Nobel Found., The Discovery of Penicillin,
http://nobelprize.org/educational-games/medicine/penicillin/readmore.html (last visited
September 17, 2006). Upon returning, Fleming observed that the mold Penicillium notatum
had grown on the plates and that it was secreting a substance (that Fleming named penicillin)
that was preventing the staphylococci from growing. Id. Fleming never fully realized the
potential for penicillin because it was unstable, so it was not until ten years later that Ernest
Chain and Sir Howard Florey began the research that ultimately led to the development of
antibiotic drugs. Id.
298. This Note does not argue that intelligent design is "religiously-based bad science" as
other commentators have done. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 225, at 240. Rather it takes the
position that intelligent design is not science-it is attempting to change science in order to
communicate a religious explanation of human origins as if it were science.
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C. Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools Would Have the Effect of
Advancing or Inhibiting Religion
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the substantive teaching of
intelligent design in public schools is unconstitutional on the basis that it
would fail Lemon's purpose prong. However, assuming for the moment
that intelligent design is both a religious doctrine and a valid scientific
theory, and thus could be taught substantively for a plausible secular
purpose, it is worth briefly noting that teaching intelligent design in public
schools would inevitably fail Lemon's effects prong. Government cannot
declare the truth or falsity of a religious doctrine.2 99 However, the entire
purpose of intelligent design is to identify evidence in nature that an
intelligent designer exists outside of nature. In other words, the theory
seeks to prove the existence of a supernatural creator as true. Even if
intelligent design used valid scientific methods to achieve this purpose,
mandating the substantive teaching of intelligent design in public schools
must fail Lemon's effects prong because substantively teaching intelligent
design cannot avoid attempting to advance the truth of this religious
proposition.
Interestingly, assuming intelligent design uses valid scientific methods to
prove the existence of a supernatural creator, it may actually have the effect
of inhibiting religion because it brings the existence of a supernatural
creator within the ambit of science. If this is so, then science can just as
easily disprove the existence of the creator as it can prove the existence of
one, depending on the evidence. Government cannot compel education in a
discipline that relegates religious belief to scientific proof or disproof. This
Note has agreed with other commentators that whatever religion is, it
involves a belief in an extra-human source of value, which takes religion
out of the arena of public debate. 300 Religion is true on the basis of faith
alone. Accordingly, intelligent design may undermine religion as much as
it does science.
D. If Asked About Intelligent Design, Public School Teachers Should Refer
Students to Learn About Intelligent Design at Home or Places of Worship
Although teaching intelligent design substantively as a competing
scientific theory in public schools would violate the Establishment Clause,
it would be permissible, in theory, for public school teachers to describe the
theory to students so long as they do so without vouching for or rejecting its
validity, as commentators such as Wexler and Olin have argued.30 1 The
Establishment Clause does not prohibit discussion of religious topics in
299. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 149, at 89.
300. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
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public schools; rather it prohibits schools from teaching subjects in a way
that either advances or inhibits religion.30 2
For example, if public school teachers want to educate their students
about the history of opposition to evolution, or the proposals throughout the
United States to include alternative origins theories into science curricula,
or to discuss the legal implications of the controversy, including the Dover
decision, they could legally do so. Presumably, a basic discussion of
intelligent design would be necessary to discuss these topics effectively. So
long as it is clear from the curriculum that evolution is taught as the
scientific understanding of origins and the merits of intelligent design are
not presented or endorsed, the constitutional line would not, in theory, be
crossed.
However, discussing intelligent design without endorsing or rejecting its
validity will involve walking a very fine line. Some might view the mere
description of intelligent design as an endorsement of intelligent design.
Given the historic contentiousness of the debate over teaching alternative
origins theories in public schools, discussing intelligent design in public
schools at any level will likely provoke constitutional challenge. Resolving
whether or not public school teachers cross the constitutional line would
involve highly fact-intensive inquiries into whether teachers endorse or
dispute the validity of intelligent design during the course of their
discussions. The more teachers educate their students about the substance
of intelligent design, the more an argument can be made that, to a
reasonable observer, teachers appear to endorse intelligent design's validity.
To avoid such scrutiny, public school teachers must take care to avoid
discussing the substance of intelligent design altogether. If public school
teachers are asked about intelligent design, they should inform their
students that some people believe in religious understandings of human
origins but that public school is not the appropriate place to debate those
issues. Public school teachers should refer their students to discuss these
issues at home or at places of worship.
This Note advocates a more conservative position on this point than
previous commentators such as Wexler and Olin and disagrees with them
on other related points. For example, Olin has argued that concepts upon
which intelligent design is based, such as the concept of irreducible
complexity, could be taught substantively in science class as a secular
criticism of evolution. 30 3 Olin interprets irreducible complexity as not
suggesting any "religious or nonreligious view" but rather as a "scientific
and testable theory that presents a natural observation challenging
302. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) ("[S]tudy of religions and of the
Bible from a literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment's prohibition[; however]
the State may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which 'aid or
oppose' any religion." (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963))).
303. See Olin, supra note 241, at 1143-44.
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evolution." 304 Therefore, Olin argues that so long as the concept is not used
as "evidence of a designing agent," it may be taught in science class.30 5
However, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, irreducible complexity
cannot be discussed without implicating the designer, it is not a scientific or
testable theory, and it is not a natural observation. 30 6 Therefore, teachers
may not legally present irreducible complexity as a scientific concept or
endorse its merits. Overall, the only way to avoid a context-specific and
fact-intensive constitutional inquiry is for teachers not to discuss the
substance of intelligent design at any level. Public school teachers should
refer their students to discuss such issues at home or at places of worship.
CONCLUSION
The debate in the United States over human origins is once again in full
swing. However, it is important to clarify that for constitutional purposes,
this debate is not about which side is right or wrong: It is about
jurisdiction. If the theory of intelligent design is correct, it cannot be taught
as true in the public school classroom because it is an inherently religious
doctrine and is not science. In fact, even if it could be taught as science, it
would inevitably have the effect of subjecting an inherently religious
doctrine to scientific proof or disproof, which government cannot allow
because it would be the equivalent of declaring religious truth or falsity.
Intelligent design could, in theory, be introduced to public school
students so long as views on intelligent design's merits are not discussed.
However, since substantively teaching intelligent design in public schools is
unconstitutional, discussing intelligent design at even a basic level might
provoke a legal challenge that teachers and schools endorse its validity.
Resolving such disputes would involve fact-intensive inquiries and
therefore, if asked about intelligent design, public school teachers should
inform students that some people believe in religious understandings of
human origins and that students should turn to their families or places of
worship to discuss those understandings.
304. Id. at 1144.
305. Id.
306. See supra Part III.B.2.
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